Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.

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Year of publication:	2014-07-31
Authors:	Kamada, Yuichiro ; Fudenberg, Drew
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - 2014
Publisher:	Econometric Society
Subject:	Rationalizablity \| common knowledge \| extensive-form games \| self-confirming equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010819346