Reciprosity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Blurry Belief Approach

Two long lived players play a repeated coordination game. Players do not specify a single (and correct) probability to each event. They have a vague notion about the evolution of the play, called blurry beliefs, which guide their behavior. General conditions that ensure cooperation are investigated. Key words: Repeated Games, Learning, Cooperation, Bounded Rationality, Equilibrium Selection.

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Year of publication:	1997-11
Authors:	Sandroni, Alvaro
Institutions:	Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 1200
Classification:	D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766729