Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Maniadis, Zacharias |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 43.2014, 4, p. 991-1008
|
Subject: | Self-confirming equilibrium | Equilibrium refinement | Belief-based learning | Manipulation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Lernprozess | Learning process | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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