Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Iwata, Yukinori |
Subject: | Strategic nomination | Opinion-based strategy-proofness | Two-stage voting procedure | Strategy-proofness | Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem |
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