The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

Christoph Frei, Benjamin Bernard

We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and the role of public randomization to move continuously across games within the same model.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	May 2016
Authors:	Bernard, Benjamin ; Frei, Christoph
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 2, p. 411-453
Subject:	Folk theorem \| repeated games \| continuous time \| imperfect observability \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Folk-Theorem \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1687 [DOI] hdl:10419/150282 [Handle]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672043