The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and the role of public randomization to move continuously across games within the same model.

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Year of publication:	2016
Authors:	Frei, Christoph ; Bernard, Benjamin
Published in:	Theoretical Economics. - New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 11.2016, 2, p. 411-453
Publisher:	New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society
Subject:	Folk theorem \| repeated games \| continuous time \| imperfect observability

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE1687 [DOI] 893334154 [GVK] hdl:10419/150282 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:1687 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599573