The interactive effect of monitoring and incentive alignment on agency costs

Geoffrey P. Martin, Robert M. Wiseman, Luis R. Gomez-Mejia

Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Martin, Geoffrey ; Wiseman, Robert M. ; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R.
Published in:	Journal of management. - London [u.a.] : Sage Publ., ISSN 1557-1211, ZDB-ID 2015295-4. - Vol. 45.2019, 2, p. 701-727
Subject:	agency theory \| executive compensation \| CEO decision making \| incentive alignment \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation \| Corporate Governance \| Corporate governance \| Leistungsbeurteilung \| Employee performance appraisal \| Theorie \| Theory \| Entscheidung \| Decision

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