The ombudsman : a closer look at the efficiency of top executive pay and incentives
Christopher S. Armstrong
| Year of publication: |
2013
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Armstrong, Christopher |
| Other Persons: | Jacquart, Philippe (reviewed) ; Armstrong, J. Scott (contributor) |
| Published in: |
Interfaces : the INFORMS journal on the practice of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0092-2102, ZDB-ID 120785-4. - Vol. 43.2013, 6, p. 590-592
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| Subject: | executive compensation | incentives | pay for performance | contract design | corporate governance | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Großbritannien | United Kingdom | Anreiz | Incentives | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |