A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, whichprovides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use thelessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance inpractice....

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives.We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the trueperformance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expectedto be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three noncompetingexplanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of boardmonitoring is hidden in stock price...

The Peter Principle captures two stylized facts about hierarchies: first, promotions often placeemployees into jobs for which they are less well suited than for that previously held. Second,demotions are extremely rare...

To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both be 'good' (enhancing...

The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...

Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents' productivities. Firms' practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a quot;one-size-fits-allquot; approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by...

The impact of wage increases on job satisfaction is explored theoretically and empirically. To do this, we apply a utility function that rises with the absolute wage level as well as with wage increases. It is shown that when employees can influence their wages by exerting effort, myopic utility...

Although it has long been conjectured that having physicians in leadership positions is valuable for hospital performance, there is no published empirical work on the hypothesis. This cross-sectional study reports the first evidence. Data are collected on the top-100 U.S. hospitals in 2009, as...

We study how managers value applicant credentials and personal traits in hiring decisions. Using the ordered probit model, we confirm previous results -managers rank applicant traits higher than credentials. However, we also uncover patterns not previously observed - managerial valuations of...