of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition …

We extend the work on coalition formation in global pollution control by allowing for multiple coalitions. Equilibrium …

coalition, and regions which have the highest claims according to the respective sharing rule. Furthermore, we find that a … grandfathering scheme leads to the largest and - in terms of greenhouse gas abatement - most successful coalition, while many of the …

international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a … climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge … despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries …

control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to coalition formation is used to analyse profitability and stability of the … countries, carbon leakage reduces the size of the equilibrium coalition and even the likelihood of a successful negotiation. On …