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Secure implementability under Pareto-efficient rules in linear production economies with classical preferences
Nishizaki, Katsuhiko - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 72 (2018) 3, pp. 379-383
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041875
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Secure implementation
Saijō, Tatsuyoshi; Sjöström, Tomas; Yamato, Takehiko - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 2 (2007) 3, pp. 203-229
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702527
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Experimental gaming comparison of resource allocation rules in case of transferable utilities
Korgin, N. A.; Korepanov, V. O. - In: International game theory review 19 (2017) 2, pp. 1-11
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011754574
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Full-truthful implementation in Nash equilibria
Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - 2006
We consider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibriumoutcomes of the mechanismshould coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We showthat restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332282
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Privacy in implementation
Gradwohl, Ronen - In: Social choice and welfare 50 (2018) 3, pp. 547-580
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016838
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Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
Kunimoto, Takashi - In: Journal of mathematical economics 82 (2019), pp. 247-263
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105845
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A solution to the two-person implementation problem
Laslier, Jean-François; Núñez, Matías; Sanver, M. Remzi - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012233252
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A simple and procedurally fair game form for nash implementation of the no-envy solution
Hagiwara, Makoto - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 20 (2020) 1, pp. 1-5
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012170707
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Partially-honest Nash implementation : a full characterization
Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2017
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011755972
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Implementation via approval mechanisms
Núñez, Matías; Xefteris, Dimitrios - In: Journal of economic theory 170 (2017), pp. 169-181
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011776939